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CHAPTER THREE
The Princeton System of Doctrines and Meanings

Outline of the Chapter

The nine pioneer members of the Laos Mission took a set of working principles and ideas with them to Chiang Mai that demonstrated striking, if roughly hewn, parallels to the Princeton Theology. While, as we saw in Chapter Two, it is impossible to gauge precisely the direct impact Princeton had on Chiang Mai, a number of impressions stand out. First, Princeton did, possibly, have some immediate influence on the Laos Mission through the persons of McGilvary and Wilson, most particularly McGilvary—the evident theological parallels and his passing, entirely unaffected references to the Princetonians and to Reformed confessionalism encouraging such a conclusion. Second, the theological expressions of the other early members of the mission and McGilvary's theological accreditation of some of them leave the strong impression that all but Vrooman shared Princeton's general theological orientation. Even Vrooman had some contact with Princeton, through the pastor of the church he attended in New York City. Third, apart from a few of McGilvary's theological comments, the missionary record does not contain the Princeton Theology as such, if by the "Princeton Theology" we mean the clearly articulated, self-conscious system of doctrines found in Archibald Alexander's A Brief Outline of the Evidences of the Christian Religion, Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology, or A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology. The missionaries' writings do contain evidence of a Reformed confessional system of doctrines like Princeton, but such hints of Princeton do not in and of themselves constitute the Princeton Theology in a formal sense, even in the case of Dr. McGilvary.

The Laos Mission did not transport the full set of Princeton's system of doctrines to Chiang Mai, although strong traces of many of its doctrines remained. It did import a sys-

tem of doctrines and meanings that it in all probability received partly from Princeton through McGilvary and Wilson and otherwise shared in varying degrees with the great majority of American evangelicals. The Princeton Theology is, thus, important to the study of Presbyterian missionary thought and behavior in northern Siam primarily and most importantly because it provides a wealth of well-organized, carefully written material from which to mine the system of meanings and doctrines shared by the members of the mission. These direct and indirect links between Princeton and the Laos Mission are not merely a matter of curiosity. They offer, if the thesis of this dissertation is correct, "substantial insights into the system of doctrines and meanings of the Laos Mission, which system comprised a key source of missionary behavior in the years from 1867 to 1880." They help to explain, again if our thesis is correct, why the mission failed to present its message in ways that facilitated rather than obstructed that message's acceptance by the vast majority of northern Thais.

An appreciation of the system of theology taught at Princeton is thus important to our more focused understanding of the pattern of events in Chiang Mai and the missionary system of doctrines and meanings that subsumed those events. We cannot base that appreciation, however, on the tables of contents of the Princeton circle's major works. One must look to the less obvious ways in which the Princeton theologians structured their thinking as they created their tables of contents, wrote their articles in the Princeton Review, and taught their students at the seminary.

To anticipate what follows, we will see that Princeton operated from a set of theological principles, which it believed are revealed in the Bible and implanted in human consciousness. It held that the Holy Spirit uses these principles to inform the Christian mind concerning divine truth and enthuse the Christian heart with the power of that truth. The Princeton circle believed that its principles and the truth comes from God and must be absolutely distinguished from all that is evil, immoral, and false. They branded anything that contradicted their principles with the labels of impiety, heathenism, and, ultimately, Satan. The Princetonians claimed, in defense of their principles, that faithful Christians are able to know God and the truth, as opposed to infidels and heathens who know neither God nor truth. They assumed, once again, that any system of theology, philosophy, or morals that contradicted the Princeton Theology also contradicted divine truth. Taken as a package, this set of ideas amounted to a closed system of thought that purposefully, systematically eschewed even slight deviations from what it understood to be orthodox Calvinism. When removed to northern Siam, this closed theological system functioned, in effect, like an ideology, which encouraged the early members of the Laos Mission to take an antagonistic attitude towards northern Thai culture and religious consciousness. Their failure to shape their message to communicate effectively within the northern Thai context followed like night follows day.

Introduction

Old School Presbyterians, including the Princeton professors, found antebellum America a challenging and, in some ways, an aggravating venue for theological reflection. The Enlightenment's radical skeptics had already initiated a frontal assault on organized Christianity, charging it with the crimes of superstition, ignorance, and spiritual totalitarianism. Romanticism's devotees passionately joined the chorus of criticism, while in New England, supposedly orthodox Calvinists experimented with "new" theologies, which the New School was introducing into the Presbyterian Church itself and which the Old School believed shaded off into heresy. Emotional frontier revivalism, and German skepticism, meanwhile only added to the pressure felt by those who cherished Reformed orthodoxy. This contentious context confronted the Reformed tradition's defenders with a two-fold challenge: first, they had to preserve orthodoxy. Second, they had to shape their defense of orthodoxy to the intellectual and spiritual currents of their time, currents dominated by the moderate Enlightenment and smitten with Baconian common sense thought. They had to defend orthodoxy, that is, in a Scottish mode. In the process, the Princeton circle created a system of meanings and doctrines that drew on both the principles of Reformed theology and evangelical piety.

Principles

Theological reflection at Princeton invariably began with certain fundamental principles, assembled through a process of combining the traditional theological principles of Reformed confessionalism and the first principles of Common Sense Philosophy. The Reformed tradition, from the time of Calvin's successor, Beza, operated on the basis of a collection of theological principles, principia theologiae, which principles it held to be biblical, necessarily true, immediately knowable, and normative.

The Scottish philosophers, in their turn, claimed the existence of another set of principles that are immutable, commonsensical, known intuitively, self-evident to all normal and unprejudiced people, impossible to reject, real, true, and planted by God in the constitution of human nature itself.

Princeton merged these two views of fundamental or first principles, thus ground-

ing its system of meanings in a doubly solid and well-established panoply of basic presuppositions, variously listed and described.

Princeton, taking its cue from its Reformed heritage, consistently sought to ground its theological principles in the Scriptures, embracing the Bible as its unquestioned source for all religious truths. William Henry Green, a member of the seminary faculty for over fifty years, stated that the Bible is an "infallible communication from God" ruled over by the "immediate voice and hand of God." He rejected out of hand any and all doubts and criticisms of the Bible that questioned its authority, arguing that such doubts only left the doubter stranded in a vacillating, indecisive darkness.

Alluding to the ground of Princeton's theological principles, he also stated, as we saw in Chapter One, that the Princetonians rejected any doctrines or views that "the word of God, honestly expounded, will not sanction."

Princeton, in sum, based its basic principles on the infallible and immediate authority of God's Word, a strong and sure foundation on which to build its theology.

Princeton, also taking its cue from Common Sense Philosophy, just as consistently sought to root its theological principles in common sense. In his argument for the universality of religion, Archibald Alexander reasons that human nature must have a religion of one kind or another, that all peoples have a capacity for religion, and that, as a result, no nation has ever been found without religion. He concludes that, "these principles of our nature are so deeply radicated, that they never can be removed." Charles Hodge followed a similar line of reasoning in his argument that humanity is composed of two substances, body and soul. He contends that, "The idea of substance is one of the primary truths of the reason. It is given in the consciousness of every man, and is therefore a part of the universal faith of men." He went on to assert that, "it is intuitively certain that matter and mind are two distinct substances. And such has been the faith of the great body of mankind."

Princeton, thus, also established its fundamental principles on the consciousness and commonly held beliefs of humanity, which again provided it with a secure, trustworthy foundation on which to build its systems of meanings and of doctrines.

Princeton availed itself of the best of two worlds, Reformed confessional theology and Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. Hodge summed up his argument for the existence of both soul and body with the ringing affirmation that, "It is the common belief of mankind, the clearly revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the church

universal, that the soul can, and does exist, and act after death." His principle was that body and soul are separate, real entities, and he based that principle on considerations that were at one and the same time commonsensical, biblical, and orthodox. Archibald Alexander put the matter more generally and simply, stating, "But it is reasonable to believe what by our senses we perceive to exist; and it is reasonable to believe whatever God declares to be true."

It is reasonable, that is, to depend on common sense and the Bible, the repositories of, respectively, sensible and religious truths. Alexander also wove an orthodox evangelical sense of spiritual renewal into the fabric of these principles by equating the knowledge of them with the work of the Holy Spirit. He held that the Holy Spirit alone provides the illumination or enlightenment necessary to fully understand basic theological principles.

Only converted, enlightened Christians, according to Alexander, can gain full knowledge of the fundamental principles that subsume all of reality, including most particularly the Christian religion itself.

The Princeton theologians offered various lists of confessional-commonsensical first principles, depending on the particular issue or topic under discussion. Hodge, for example, provides a list of basic assumptions, or principles, in his argument that we can understand the nature of God by abstracting human characteristics to their perfect state, namely that humanity knows and God is all knowing and that humans love and God is perfect love. He writes,

Hodge's first principles, in this case, include: God is the Father of Spirits. We share in God's generic nature. God created us in God's image. Taken together, these principles reveal another first principle, fundamental to all others, namely that we are like God and God is like us. The Princeton circle habitually created and used such lists of first principles, as can be seen from the example of their more general views on the Bible. They believed that Christ, for example, is the central theme of the Hebrew Scriptures, that particular books or parts of the Bible are inspired, that God's revelations in nature and in the Bible supplement rather than contradict each other, and that biblical scholars should be limited to dealing with strictly objective, factual data in the Bible.

The possibilities

for laying down such principles were virtually limitless, although controlled by Princeton's understanding of its Reformed heritage, the Bible, and human consciousness.

In a sense, both Hodge's immediate list of principles and the one extracted from Princeton's views of the Bible appear to be merely lists of narrowly constructed religious doctrines. What transformed them into principles that are more general was the unequivocal manner in which Princeton associated them with human consciousness. Hodge argued that any refusal to accept the basic doctrines of the Christ faith constitutes an offense against reason and God. Those doctrines are "sustained by a well authenticated revelation of God," a revelation that is proved by the same weight of evidence that our senses and consciousness provide us concerning external and internal realities. Hodge claimed that disobedience to the divinely given commonsense principles of human consciousness is unreasonable and constitutes rebellion against God.

He almost unconsciously leaped, that is, from doctrines to consciousness to commonsense principles, thereby translating Reformed orthodoxy into the idiom of Common Sense Philosophy. He could just as easily vault in the other direction, jumping from philosophy to theology. In his classroom lectures on systematic theology, for example, Hodge provided his students with three commonsensical principles to explain why Christians must place their religious trust in common sense: first, our very nature, as God created it, leads us to trust the testimony of our senses; second, placing confidence in our senses is thus the same as trusting God; and, third, all revelation is first addressed to the senses, be it hearing the Word preached or seeing it through reading.

Where earlier generations of orthodox Reformed savants drew only on Geneva for their principia theologiae, Princeton also called upon Edinburgh's first principles in order to reinforce their own principles in a manner relevant to an age that put great store, as we have seen, in the Scottish Enlightenment.

One can judge Princeton's principles in at least two different ways. On the one hand, some scholars criticize both the common sense philosophers and the Princeton theologians for arbitrarily turning anything and everything convenient to their own prejudices into supposedly unassailable first principles. Loetscher observes, "When used loosely, without the safeguards that the father of the Scottish philosophy [Reid] sought to place upon them, the concept [of first principles] could easily be made to endorse many a dogmatism."

Taylor claims that Archibald Alexander did precisely that. He transformed his own theological views on biblical inspiration, the workings of providence, and the authority of the Bible into commonsensical first principles of human consciousness. This approach, Taylor contends, prevented Archibald from accepting any views on the text of the Bible that contradicted his own, because in Alexander's view, "the results of any

legitimate critical inquiry into the texts would necessarily corroborate the orthodox understanding of the scriptures."

Princeton's use of Reformed and Enlightenment strategies in tandem has left them open, in sum, to the charge of creating a self-serving, closed doctrinal system impervious to contradiction. On the other hand, if we understand Princeton's concern to establish and defend a system of meanings and doctrines that it believed divinely inspired and rooted in human consciousness, the professors' wedding of Reformed and Enlightenment thought appears, perhaps, less self-serving than self-reinforcing. It surely had several advantages, not the least of which was its relevance to its antebellum cultural context, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment, that Princeton's reliance on an indeterminate number of enlightened theological principles provided it a firm conceptual base from which to develop its system of doctrines and meanings, whether in the United States or northern Siam.

Princeton faced certain problems, however, including a number of difficult questions. If, before all else, its doctrines were so evidently commonsensical, why did so many of Princeton's contemporaries refuse to accept them? The professors had a ready answer. Adopting Reid's criticism of Hume, they claimed that their doctrines and views represented first principles while their adversaries based their opinions on unfounded presuppositions and, frequently, obvious, willful prejudices. Henry C. Alexander declared that all of the philosophies that stood in opposition to Christian revelation, from ancient times to the present, founded themselves on false assumptions. Removing those assumptions, he claimed, reinstated commonsensical theism immediately.

Archibald Alexander applied this general principle to Hume's denial of miracles, arguing that Hume engaged in a process of circular reasoning by which he first assumed that miracles cannot take place and then turned around and made that assumption his conclusion. Alexander complains, "What sort of reasoning is it, then, to form an argument against the truth of miracles founded on the assumption, that they never existed?"

Green similarly attacked an English biblical scholar for engaging in a specious method of circular reasoning based on foregone conclusions. He writes, "As a matter of course the critic finds exactly what he wishes to find." He also complains, "If this method is allowable there is no difficulty in proving anything that a man may undertake to prove."

To those, in sum, who might wonder why so many others disagreed with the Princeton Theology and its many principles, the Princeton circle answered that false and frequently prejudiced assumptions blinded its opponents to the truth.

J. Addison Alexander's critique of German biblical studies and their interpretation of the Gospels, however, demonstrates that Princeton based its own principles on assumptions just as much as did its opponents. Alexander advised those college and seminary teachers who wanted to bring German biblical studies into their classrooms that, "With respect to the principles on which the teacher should proceed in digesting these materials, we need hardly say that he must necessarily assume the inspiration of the gospels and their consistency one with another." Alexander went on to criticize radical German interpretations of the Gospels for starting from purely speculative false assumptions that could be used to prove anything. He does not seems to have realized that "the Germans" could have just as easily accused him of starting with an unwarranted assumption, namely that the Bible is divinely inspired. As early as 1825, Hodge warned that the preconceived assumptions of those who engaged in philosophical speculations represented the greatest danger facing biblical studies. Hodge, nonetheless, worked from his own set of preconceived assumptions, arguing that the only cure for speculative theological abuse of the Scriptures is careful, reverential inductive study of the Bible based on the conviction of its divine origin and the need to rely on the Holy Spirit to overcome human resistance to the Truth. Alexander and Hodge's views depended upon fundamental assumptions just as much as any of those whom they criticized, the difference being, in their own opinion, that their assumptions were based on the Bible, inspired by God, and arrived at through the carefully wrought inductive method of Bacon.

Princeton's construction of its first principles on the twin pillars of Reformed theology and Enlightenment philosophy provided it with a doubly secure foundation for its system of doctrines and meanings. Those principles were at one and the same time self-authenticating and authoritative, being grounded in human consciousness and divine revelation. Princeton believed that these two sources of its knowledge of first principles rendered the principles themselves unassailable and proved them obviously different from the false assumptions of those who disagreed with Princeton's views on theology and philosophy. On this apparently solid foundation, it built the rest of its theology.

Piety

Princeton's evangelical context required it, however, to mold a theology that satisfied the pious heart as well as the rational mind. It accomplished that task through a relatively straightforward strategy that aligned the mind and heart, based on three principles: First, it posited an essential unity between right thinking and right feeling. Second, it held that right feeling cannot contradict right thinking. Third, Princeton involved the Holy Spirit in the process of right thinking and feeling.

Alexander, "The Gospel History," 604, 610ff. For the similar views of his father, Archibald Alexander, see Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment, 219-20.

Calhoun, Princeton, 116-17.

First, mind and heart comprise an essential unity. Archibald Alexander believed that it is difficult to frame the truths of the Bible in logical statements because they involve more than just the intellect. He avowed that those biblical truths have an "astonishing power" over ethical behavior and æsthetics as well—a power to penetrate the heart and influence the conscience. Alexander states, "There is a sublime sanctity in the doctrines and precepts of the Gospel; a devotional and heavenly spirit pervading the Scriptures; a purity and holy tendency which cannot but be felt by the serious reader of the word of God, and a power to soothe and comfort the sorrowful mind…" His son, James W. Alexander, declared that God created the human heart and mind as well as the body, and Christ expected his followers to render him "a service of mind and heart." Hodge's writings contain a sprinkling of aphorisms making the same point, namely that the Christian heart and mind are congruent with each other. He asserts, as one example, that, "All religious language false to the intellect is profane to the feelings and a mockery of God." The principle in all cases is the same, namely that one cannot divorce piety from doctrines, heart from mind.

Second, the Princetonians believed that right thinking and correct doctrines provide an important way to achieve right feeling and piety. Although this second principle would seem to be an obvious corollary of the first, it entailed a slight but highly important shift in emphasis toward the mind that quietly reinforced the integrity of Princeton's principia theologiae as commonsense first principles. We have already seen in Chapter Two that Princeton generally believed that the heart is the seat of human corruption while the mind is the avenue for reaching into the heart. Wrong feeling is the problem. Right thinking is the solution. James W. Alexander argues, accordingly, that sin dethrones the higher powers of the mind and puts "the inferior passions and carnal appetites" in their place. Conversion removes the mental disorders of sin, restores harmony, and reorients the affections to center on "things above." According to Alexander, furthermore, matters of doctrine and intellect must be set straight if one is to achieve a state of inner harmony between mind and heart. He sums up his observations by stating, "The closest connexion between faith and love is manifest from the nature of the case; as no object can be loved which is not perceived; and the more vividly an object of love is presented to the mind, the more is the affection increased in vigour." Perception precedes affection. Mind drives emotions. For Green, the key to the process of achieving inner harmony was the proper apprehension of the true meaning of Christian doctrines; he objected to German biblical scholarship because its critical theories destroyed the factual,

A. Alexander, Evidences, 179; and J. W. Alexander, Discourses, 245.

Hodge, Essays and Reviews, 561. See also Charles Hodge, "Question No. 60. How is the Sabbath to be Sanctified?" (Bellefonte, PA: Bellefonte Press Company, n.d.), 9; and Hodge, Way of Life, 167.

Alexander, Practical Sermons, 117-18.

Alexander, Practical Sermons, 253.

rational foundation of biblical religion. Gaining a correct understanding of the meaning of Christian doctrines is crucial, he thought, to religious life. In the particular case of "heathen" peoples, he believed that it is essential to "christianize" their languages as part of the process of conversion. The process could not be completed until those languages are "reached and purified."

Faith, piety, the heart, right affections—by whatever name we chose to call the Christian's inner life and relationship with God, Princeton firmly pegged that life to right thinking, the concern for proper doctrines and sensible principles. It cut its piety from the same bolt of cloth as its theology and ideology. Feelings strengthened the common sense foundations on which both were based.

Third, the process of reaching the heart through the mind depends on the Holy Spirit. That is to say, the powerful and ultimately authoritative work of the Spirit in the deepest recesses of the human soul validated Princeton's commonsense perception of reality. On Sunday afternoon, 26 November 1854, Dr. Hodge addressed his weekly conference with the student body, presumably with Wilson and McGilvary in attendance, on the subject of "The indwelling of the Spirit." He opened his informal comments with the statement that certain specific effects always mark the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Among these effects, he included "graces," which are the fruits of the Spirit. He went on to say that,

The first grace given through the Holy Spirit, in other words, is that of right thinking, which is a matter of spiritual discernment as well as intellectual understanding. The Spirit and knowledge cannot be separated from each other. Hodge also believed that the indwelling of the Spirit confirmed orthodoxy's principia theologiae, which were also Princeton's commonsense first principles of theology and faith. He based his entire system of meanings on this epistemological-spiritual foundation, which included the love of truth, adherence to truth, the unity of that truth, and the preservation of Christian faith. His final statement, above, relates his views on the relationship between the Spirit and knowledge back to the context of Common Sense Philosophy; the grace of knowledge rests on convictions so compelling and immediate that neither philosophical skepticism nor

infidelity of any sort could shake it. That is precisely Reid's contention against Hume: the intuited principles of common sense are so immediate, so obviously true that no amount of skepticism can shake one's belief in them.

Princeton built its system of doctrines and meanings on a theology that drew upon Common Sense Philosophy to establish its own biblical-theological principles as God-given intuited first principles of human consciousness. It held that such principles could not be "proved" by reason, but must be accepted as residing in the very structure of human nature itself, in the feelings as well as the intellect. God not only created these principles in us, but also reconfirms them through the agency of the Holy Spirit. The Princeton circle, thus, began with its own set of theological assumptions, transformed them into commonsense principles, and then defined and defended them as intellectually and spiritually incontrovertible. It was a closed system intended to function as a credible, solid, and convincing defense of Reformed confessional orthodoxy. The Princeton Theology, as we have already seen, was born into hard times for orthodoxy; the forces of infidelity seemed to be on the march at every quarter of the compass. Reformed confessional theology in America could withstand the onslaught only if it had a defense fitting to both its theological heritage and its post-Revolutionary, Enlightenment context, such as would give it a solid ideological base from which to achieve its defense of orthodoxy.

In Defense of Orthodoxy and Reality

If there was one thing that Princeton and its Old School compatriots believed more firmly than anything else, it was that "Calvinism" embodied the truest, most pure and faithful system of theology and the best distillation of the teachings of Jesus available to humanity. Its principia theologiae were contained in both the Bible and the human heart. Conservative Presbyterians felt deeply compelled thus to defend this system of truth, especially in the difficult decades of the Early Republic and the Antebellum. At a time in which inherited social and political structures came under increasing attack, the system they defended encompassed social as well as theological concerns, which meant that they required a system of defense that would uphold traditional social and political structures as well as religious and theological orthodoxy. The members of the Princeton circle found that system in their unique blend of confessionalism, common sense thought, and evangelicalism.

Old School Presbyterian leaders, indeed, established Princeton Seminary for the very purpose of defending and disseminating Old School confessionalism through the

training of an educated clergy, who would be well able to combat the forces of deism, emotional excess, speculative philosophy, and heresies of all stripes. In his 1812 inaugural address as the seminary's first professor, Archibald Alexander focused his audience's attention on apologetical issues, mounted a defense of the inspiration of the Bible, and gave a rebuttal of Hume's arguments against miracles. The seminary's original plan and early curriculum also reflected the intention of its founders, including most particularly Alexander, to defend orthodoxy from the forces of infidelity, an intention that strongly shaped Princeton's subsequent history.

Nothing symbolized and embodied Princeton's commitment to the defense of Reformed orthodoxy more than its flagship publication, The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, more widely known simply as the Princeton Review. It provided an ideal format for identifying and attacking infidelity while defending Reformed confessionalism. Noll suggests that Hodge's polemical writings in the Princeton Review provide a "fuller, more comprehensive picture" of his thought than any other of his works, including his Systematic Theology. He concludes, "Hodge's defense of the Reformed faith in the Princeton Review is a vast and complex subject. The journal's pages were his bricks from which he constructed a fortress for defending an Augustinian Calvinism that still insisted on the sovereignty of God in salvation."

Princeton Seminary existed, above all else, to defend Reformed orthodoxy.

While its Early Republic-antebellum context may have, in a sense, driven the Old School and Princeton to a concern with apologetics, they took to the tasks of defending the faith and attacking infidelity with a will born of both their Reformed and Enlightenment heritages. Reformed confessionalism, right down to the time of Turretin, faced a situation somewhat similar to the one American orthodox evangelicals confronted in the post-Revolutionary era. They each emerged out of a period of contending religious forces that threw them on the defensive and encouraged them to develop a more scholastic, articulated set of doctrines. Those doctrines allowed Reformed theologians of both eras to aggressively defend their own understanding of Christian faith and attack deviations from that understanding.

The Enlightenment, although frequently antagonistic to the Christian religion, was no less zealous in its defense of truth and attacks on superstition. The more moderate Common Sense philosophers, in particular, pursued a clear apologetical agenda in their assertion that Hume and other radical Enlightenment thinkers engaged in wild speculations that undermined tradition and common sense.

Ahlstrom concludes with disarming simplicity, "The Scottish Philosophy was an apologetical philosophy, par

excellence."

Reformed confessionalism defined and defended the reality of truth. Common Sense Philosophy defined and defended the truth of reality. Princeton combined the two in a profound commitment to defend old truths in new, difficult times.

As inheritors of both Reformed confessionalism and the Scottish Enlightenment, Princeton worked out a particular format or style of presentation that appears repeatedly in its apologetical literature, one that proceeds in a series of steps: First, the Princeton authors identified the orthodox doctrine or principle they intended to defend. Second, they described the various mistaken positions of others to the left and right of the true, orthodox position. Their position, that is, was the via media between the errors of extremism. Third, they then demonstrated the reasons for the correctness of orthodox thought, using biblical citations and logical arguments to make their case. Finally, they often referred to commonsensical principles including the generally accepted views (the common sense) of the church over the centuries. There were variations on these steps, of course, but most of them are found most of the time in most of Princeton's apologetical literature. Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology is an important example, as are A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology and his commentary on the Westminster Confession, The Confession of Faith. William Henry Green favored this format, as can be seen especially in his book, The Pentateuch Vindicated from the Aspersions of Bishop Colenso. Hodge, at least, used this same format extensively in the classroom, marching his students through an almost endless parade of theological errors to ascertain the correct, middle way of orthodoxy.

The professors faced still other issues, however, in their defense of orthodoxy. Just as they had to clarify why so many others disagreed with their theological principles, so too the Princetonians had to explain why they gave so much attention to the whole issue of apologetics in the first place. The short answer was that God required it of them. J. A. Alexander explained that from its earliest days the church has had to contend with doctrinal differences. Those differences represent part of God's plan for the church, forcing it to struggle with error, doubt, uncertainty, and temptation and to work its way through to the truth "by diligent investigation, careful comparison, and deliberate judgment." God, in short, used theological dissension to teach the church the rudiments of the Baconian inductive method. Alexander contended that before the church could overcome its obstacles and enemies, it had to face them. He states,

Defense of the Princeton system was taken thus to be nothing less than a sacred duty, a duty that included the use of common sense and Baconian methods for ascertaining Christian truth.

Alexander's statements and the general apologetical rationale underlying the Princeton Theology represented yet another girder reinforcing the Princeton circle's confidence in the reliability of its system of theology. According to its own self-understanding, Princeton was not merely circling the wagons for a temporary defense against an occasional attack on the frontiers of orthodoxy. The Princetonians, rather, believed that they defended the walls of a massive redoubt, one built long since by the biblical authors, under divine guidance, and strengthened by the likes of Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin.

Conclusion

Princeton's system of doctrines and meanings, in the view of its adherents, rested on a solid foundation, grounded in the traditions of Reformed confessionalism and Enlightenment common sense. That system fitted Princeton's conservative evangelical understanding of the relationship of heart to mind. It relied on the traditions and strategies of both Reformed and Enlightenment apologetics, which provided it with ready answers as to why others disagreed with Princeton's doctrines and why the church had to engage in the defense of its doctrines. It took, as we said earlier, the best from two worlds, allowing the professors to argue that their foundational principles were at once biblical (traditional, Reformed) and commonsensical (contemporary, Enlightened). In both incarnations, they held those principles to stand beyond question or doubt. The Princeton Theology was, at one and the same time, well-conceived and highly resistant to change to the point that, paradoxically, it was methodologically highly flexible and yet doctrinally just as highly inflexible. The professors could answer any question, quell any doubt, and meet any challenge without having to entertain the possibility that there might be a reason for questions, doubts, and challenges. While the Princeton Theology caused its would-be detractors endless frustration and discomfort, it encouraged its adherents to "stay the course" of their evangelical faith.

Introduction

Princeton's system of meanings was simple in its conception, drawing on the traditional principia theologiae, recasting them into a common sense mold, and ringing them with a solid defense rooted in the Bible and human nature. The system itself also involved important strands that reinforced the fundamental simplicity of the system while extending its usefulness. The most important of these for the Laos Mission's particular context include: [1] Princeton's dualistic perception of boundaries; [2] its belief that it could know the nature and will of God; and, [3] its understanding of the nature of truth. These three key strands, taken together, provide a gauge of Princeton's ability to mold its foundational principles into a more elaborate system of meanings and doctrines, one that could deal with virtually any doubt or objection. To these significant strands, must be added a fourth one, moderation, a strand that failed to make the transition to northern Siam. That failure itself reveals important data regarding the way in which the Laos Mission adapted its Princeton-like system of doctrines and meanings to its situation in Chiang Mai.

Boundaries

Theological principles define cognitive boundaries and create their own need for apologetics, which is the defense of a theologically defined cognitive territory. Boundaries may, of course, be defined loosely or precisely and may be taken with varying degrees of seriousness, but where there are theological principles there are theological and ideological boundaries. Princeton took its boundaries with the utmost seriousness and marked them with almost mathematical precision, ultimately acknowledging only two spheres or kingdoms—those of God and of Satan, good and evil, light and darkness—defined by closely drawn boundaries that allowed for no shades of gray between them. A. A. Hodge once told his students that

Thinking in terms of boundaries between the kingdoms of good and evil came easily and "naturally" to the Princeton professors, who stood as heirs of the West's larger intellectual tradition of dualistic thinking and its cognitive habit of dividing reality into opposite pairs—mind and matter, body and soul, divine and mundane, Christian and infidel.

The division of humanity into "two hostile and antagonistic parties," Alexander believed, was a consequence of Adam and Eve's original sin and God's subsequent promise to humanity of a savior. Alexander's words reflect the theological traditions of Reformed federalism with its two parties, the elect and the damned, and their two federal heads, Christ and Adam. Reformed thought had long taken the Fall with the utmost seriousness, believing that it created the oppressive conditions under which humanity has since struggled, is the source of every problem facing the human race, and also led to the division of humanity into the two camps of Christ and Satan. For a great many Reformed Christians, most notably the English Puritans, the boundary between those two camps and the ultimate necessity of finding themselves on the right side of it was a pressing, frightful concern. Reformed theologians long struggled thus with the question of assurance, how, that is, one could be sure of her or his salvation.

Princeton found the issue of assurance less immediate than its Reformed forbearers, probably because common sense thought provided it with the confidence that it could know God and God's will perfectly, if not fully (see below). The Princetonians, nonetheless, drew the boundaries between the saved and the lost just as sharply as did their Reformed predecessors. Hodge, to take one example, explains the hotly debated antebellum political issue of Sunday closing laws designed to protect the sanctity of the Sabbath in terms of two opposing camps. When church people stand on one side of the Sabbath question or any other issue and the "irreligious, as a class," take the opposite side, he reasons, invariably "the contest between them is a contest between light and darkness, between God and Satan." He summarizes the entire matter of keeping or breaking the Sabbath with the principle that, "He that will not bow to God, must bow to Satan."

We will find in Chapter Five that the concern for religious and doctrinal boundaries that lay behind this simply stated aphorism had an immense, immediate impact on the course of northern Thai church and missionary history.

That same concern for boundaries had earlier confronted the Reformed Church with the practical ecclesiastical problem of who should and who should not be admitted to full membership in local churches. Should the boundary between light and darkness cut through the society of the church itself? If so, where should Reformed churches draw the line? It resolved this dilemma by adhering to Augustine's solution, namely that since there is no human authority competent to discern the righteous from the unrighteous, both must be allowed to coexist within the church. It must be left to God to resolve the final destiny of the individual member. The Princeton theologians could not accept Augustine's compromise, however, when it came to all-important questions of doctrine; it could not allow doctrinal heresy to exist in the church. Hodge claimed that throughout the history of the church there had been two grand, antagonistic systems of theology at war with each other, the "Augustinian and anti-Augustinian" systems. The one affirms divine sovereignty, the other the rights of human nature. He held that they cannot be reconciled. Both Hodge and Alexander felt that the key to this centuries long, church-wide doctrinal conflict lay in the theological understanding of Christ. The issue was whether one viewed Christ as "a mere man, or the mighty God." Archibald Alexander states, "As we embrace the one or the other of these opinions, our whole system of doctrine will be modified. Accordingly, it is found, that all who deny the deity of Christ, reject all the fundamental truths of the Christian religion." Hodge is equally emphatic: "The difference is absolute between the inward religious state of those who regard Christ as a creature, and that of those who regard him as God. If the one be true religion, the other is impiety." The Princeton Theology, in sum, displays a keen sense of the cognitive boundaries between the kingdoms of God and Satan and a precise appreciation of who resided on which side of those boundaries.

Tongchai's study of the impact of Western conception of maps and mapping on Thailand provides an instructive parallel to the role sharply drawn boundaries played in Princeton's thinking. Tongchai observes that before the advent of Western mapping, shifting allegiances among the rulers of Southeast Asia's many petty states left political boundaries fluid, diffuse, and ill defined. The smaller principalities frequently gave allegiance to two higher political patrons, so that travelers only gradually moved across the "boundary" between those centers. There was no clearly defined geo-political boundary, that is, between Burma and Siam or Siam and Vietnam, for example. The European colonial powers could not tolerate this hazy attitude toward boundaries and insisted upon carefully surveying and marking out the lines between each state and territory—down to

McGrath, Reformed Thought, 192.

Hodge, Essays and Reviews, 614. See Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, 217, and David F. Wells, "Charles Hodge," in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1997), 45.

Alexander, Practical Sermons, 143; and Hodge, "Christianity without Christ," 359.

the inch and centimeter. They thought about territory, that is, much the way Princeton thought about theology, in terms of inches and centimeters, each valley and ridge carefully marked out and defended. The existence of such sharply defined boundaries, however, left the Princetonians with little room to maneuver or compromise. No demilitarized zone lay between truth and heresy. Hodge states in The Way of Life, "There is no middle ground between the two. Every one is either the servant of God, or the servant of the devil. Holiness is the evidence of our allegiance to our maker, sin is the service of Satan." This meant that there could be no compromises of any kind with theological error. Alexander, preaching in 1844, sought to clarify a local pastor's responsibility to resist such error and urged pastors to adhere to an uncompromising defense of the truth.

The Princeton circle emphasized Alexander's injunction against compromise for the simple reason that it believed that eternal salvation was at stake. Princeton took as one of its most important and basic first principles the "fact" that only those who accept the Christian gospel can be saved—where the principle is not stated explicitly, it was always assumed implicitly. Hodge urges that repentance "is the great, immediate and pressing duty of all who hear the gospel." They are to give up their sin and accept Christ, and if they do not, "The neglect of this duty, is the rejection of salvation. For, as we have seen, unless we repent we must perish." Alexander distilled the exclusive nature of the Christian message down into a simple aphorism, "It is the Gospel which brings God nigh."

Its narrowly constructed dualism, in sum, enabled the Princeton circle to define and defend its system of meanings as the cognitive equivalent of sacred space. They believed that they shared this territory with Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin and, most particularly, with Jesus and the biblical authors. By God's grace, then, they worked from within the sacred realm of God's kingdom for the expansion of that kingdom into the whole world. They knew themselves to be God's people, and they knew those who did not share in at least the rudiments of their orthodoxy to be God's enemies. The boundaries of Princeton's orthodoxy enabled it to define both itself and others according to a well-established, sharply-delineated set of principles that divided the elect from the reprobate, the enlightened from the superstitious, the righteous from the wicked, and the children of light from the children of darkness. Princeton's dualistic cosmology also reinforced its disinclination to engage in an open dialogue with systems of meaning that contradicted it, even when those contradicting systems were identifiably Reformed. The discourses it aimed at its opponents in the pages of the Princeton Review and other publications were pedagogical and apologetical rather than dialogical.

See Tongchai, Siam Mapped, esp. 20ff.

Hodge, Way of Life, 87.

Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, 291.

Hodge, Way of Life, 179; and Alexander, Discourses, 112-13.

One example that has received considerable scholarly attention is Hodge's feud with a former student and, briefly, colleague at Princeton Seminary, John W. Nevin; particularly at issue were the doctrines of the church, sacraments, and Incarnation. See Wallace, "History and Sacrament"; Nichols, Romanticism; and Holifield, "Mercersburg".

Doctrinal boundaries mattered to Princeton. With them, it secured its identity and at the same time acquired a sure means for knowing and categorizing those who stood outside the pale of right believing. The Princeton professors, however, faced the problem of demonstrating the certainty of its boundaries. How did they know that they had drawn those boundaries correctly? It was here that Princeton turned to the Scottish philosophers of Common Sense to gain for them an absolute confidence in the truth of their theological system.

Knowledge of God

Princeton secured its doctrines and underlying system of meanings by transforming its doctrines into commonsensical, fundamental principles established by God in human consciousness. Princeton's epistemology, as we have already seen, combined insights drawn from its confessional and common sense progenitors. From Reformed confessionalism, it inherited a general inclination to trust reason and to use reason to obtain reliable knowledge, particularly in relationship to fundamental theological truths. From the Scottish philosophers it learned to trust human consciousness and its ability to comprehend fundamental principles of knowledge, including metaphysical knowledge. That trust transformed the Reformed confessional tendency to trust human reason conditionally into a faith in human knowing that seems to have had few conditions and that Princeton seldom questioned. The fathers of American Presbyterian common sense, John Witherspoon and Samuel S. Smith, thus worked out an epistemology committed to Newtonian scientific principles and natural philosophy and so apparently trustworthy that, as Noll states, "To Smith it was self-evident that proper science set one upon a privileged road to truth." Noll goes on to note that like many thinkers of his own time, "Smith was mesmerized by Newton's accomplishments and those of other natural scientists. He felt, as did so many of his contemporaries, that the triumphs of Newton established empirical and inductive methods as the unique means for discovering the truth in any sphere." Hodge and his colleagues, like Smith before them, lived in a "luminous world" epistemologically. They believed that careful, circumspect observation proves the world really is what the human

See Phillips, "Turretin's Idea of Theology," 62ff, 82ff; and Donnelly, "Italian Influences," 92. Calvin, by way of contrast, generally emphasized the "epistemic distance" between God and humanity, a distance made even greater by the affects of sin. Humanity, thus, cannot adequately discern God through its own experi-ences and understanding, not even in nature. It does not know what it must do to obtain salvation. Calvin's views reflect an "emphasis characeristic of the Reformation on the impotence of humanity and the omnipotence of God." McGrath, Calvin, 124, 154, 157.

Kennedy, "Sin and Grace," 165-66; and Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, 290.

Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 1768-1822: The Search for a Christian Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 193.

race's common sense shows it to be. The Fall did not impair humanity's ability to know the truth.

Princeton insisted that humanity can know not only the truth concerning reality generally, but it can also know the truth about God specifically because the Bible and creation contain clear evidence of the nature and person of God. Princeton found the question regarding human knowledge of God a pressing one. Hodge felt that it lay at the very foundation of religion itself, arguing, "If God be to us an unknown God; if we know simply that he is, but not what he is, he cannot be to us the object of love or the ground of confidence. We cannot worship him or call upon him for help. Our Lord tells us that the knowledge of God is eternal life." Hodge gives the human race no choice. It must and can know God. Princeton perceived three avenues for attaining that knowledge: special revelation as contained in the Bible, human nature or consciousness, and the natural world—which three they divided into Revealed Theology (the Bible) and Natural Theology (human consciousness and the natural world). In terms of the Bible, Green states that it is "the only source of saving knowledge" and comprises a solid foundation for Christian knowledge and faith, one that has withstood a multitude of challenges over the centuries. It is the sole, ultimate base for the Christian faith. In terms of nature, Archibald Alexander writes, "The truth, however, is, that every thing which proceeds from God, whatever difficulties or obscurities accompany it, will contain and exhibit the impress of his character." And in terms of human consciousness, Hodge claims, "We are commonly and correctly said to know whatever is given in consciousness, or that can be fairly deduced from these primary truths or intuitions. It is in this sense we know God."

When the professors maintained that humanity can know God, they meant it. In his seminal essay entitled, "Can God be Known?," Hodge argues that humans know "in the constitution of our nature" who God is and goes on to state,

Hodge, here, makes a fine but highly important distinction; humanity can apprehend God but it cannot comprehend God. Earlier in the same article, he acknowledged that humanity can have only a limited, partial knowledge of God because God is infinite and humans are finite, but he insisted that within their limitations humans can truly know, or apprehend God. "God," he writes, "really is what we believe Him to be, so far as our idea of Him is determined by the revelation which He has made of Himself in his works, in the constitution of our nature, in his word, and in the person of his Son."

We do well at this point to remember that Charles Hodge and his colleagues were common sense realists and, therefore, adamant in their conviction that humanity can know reality as it really is. For them reality included Ultimate Reality, and they could no more deny the possibility of knowing God than they could deny the reliability of the human senses in obtaining true knowledge of the physical world.

With their belief that human beings can truly know or apprehend God as God actually is, Princeton took a crucial step forward in the construction of its system of meanings and doctrines. Lacking that belief, the Princeton professors could not go on to insist that they themselves knew the truth about God's nature and God's will. They could not have claimed the virtually infallible authority in matters of faith and practice that they did claim for their system of doctrines. Having averred a true knowledge of God, however, they could and did go on to assert a certain dogmatic infallibility. In the frequently quoted introduction to his Systematic Theology, Hodge states, "Believers have an unction from the Holy One: they know the truth, and that no lie (or false doctrine) is of the truth." They know the truth, he explained, as an inner conviction that cannot be shaken because it "…is founded on consciousness, and you might as well argue a man out of a belief in his existence, as out of confidence that what he is thus taught of God is true." Hodge then reminds his readers that this conviction of truth grows out of the work of the Spirit and is "confined to truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures." Many years earlier, while arguing that the Hebrew Scriptures teach that salvation cannot be won through works, he made the same claim, stating, "We have the great advantage of an infallible interpretation of these early oracles of truth, and the argumentative manner in which their authority is cited and applied prevents all obscurity as to the real intentions of the sacred writers."

When Princeton claimed that they knew God's truth as God intended to communicate divine truth, they meant it literally and without qualification. For them to believe otherwise would be tantamount to questioning the Holy Spirit's ability to communicate perfectly with the human mind and heart. If God is supreme and perfect, they reasoned, God must be able to construct a perfectly comprehensible revelation.

With the possibility of gaining true, if limited knowledge of the nature and person of God and an infallible knowledge of Scripture, Princeton also took a large step forward in the reification of its principles and the system of doctrines and meanings subsumed within them. The next step was to gain for itself priority over access to the knowledge of God. For, one could argue that the true knowledge of God described thus far is open to any individual, Christian or otherwise, who took the trouble to study nature, human consciousness, and the Bible inductively. Anyone, it would seem, could work through this process. Princeton would never have admitted to such a possibility and avoided doing so by claiming that only Christian believers could, finally, gain a clear, correct knowledge of God. Drawing yet again on both their theological and philosophical heritage, the professors used several strategies for authenticating that claim, two of the most frequent and most important being reliance, first, on the common sense of humanity and, second, on the power of the Holy Spirit.

The first way Princeton established its priority over knowledge of God was commonsensical; the Princeton circle claimed that its system of meanings was true because it represented the common sense of humanity, or of the church universal, or of orthodox Christians, or of a relevant interest group—depending on the occasion and need. Drawing on Common Sense Philosophy, they saw in the commonly held opinions of one vast majority or another a revelation of God's person and purposes, for those patient and wise enough to read it. If they could ascertain what that vast majority believed, they thought, they could understand something about God. At times, they cited the common sense of the entire human race. Hodge, as we have seen, argues that denial of the doctrine that human nature is composed of both body and soul "…is inconsistent with the common consciousness of men, who uniformly refer certain acts and states to the mind as one subject or substance, and certain others to the body as a different subject or substance." He goes on to claim that, "As this is a fact revealed in the common consciousness of men, it enters into the avowed convictions of all ages and all parts of the world. Every nation, ancient or modern, civilized or savage, has believed in the separate existence of the soul." Hodge then reinforces his point by drawing on the commonly held beliefs of the church, another "majority" that carried considerable weight with the Princetonians. He asserts that the doctrine of body and soul "…is also the faith of the universal church. The Greeks, the Latins, the Lutherans, the Reformed, in short the whole Christian world, believes that the soul lives and acts in the full exercise of all its faculties, after it has left the body." The Princetonians frequently limited "the whole Christian world," moreover, to those segments of the church that they themselves considered orthodox. Even then, the term "orthodox" could be taken to include Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy as well as Protestantism, or on other occa-

Hodge, "What is Christianity?", 133-34. See also Hodge's argument against those who believe that human nature is made up of body, soul, and spirit in which he insists that the simplier division into body and soul is "the common doctrine of the church." Hodge, "Nature of Man," 121

sions selected segments of Protestantism alone. It sometimes seems as though the Princetonians were not satisfied that they had secured a point in their apologetical debates until they could identify the common sense of one majority or another to substantiate their defense of that point. When the PCUSA was considering changing to a rotary system for electing local church elders in place of the existing system of permanent tenure, Alexander T. McGill defended the older system by claiming that it was the "universal usage" of English-speaking Presbyterian immigrants to the American colonies and their home churches in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Viewed from beyond Common Sense's pale, it is difficult to see the relevance of such an artificial, contrived "majority" to deciding whether to adhere to a rotary or life-tenure system for electing elders. For those, like McGill and his colleagues at Princeton, ascertaining the common sense of the mass of common people was always a relevant, crucial matter—no matter how limited or artificial that mass might be.

Princeton did not depend on common sense alone, nonetheless, to establish its epistemological priority over the knowledge of God. Hodge made that point by observing that there is a difference between mere learning and the knowledge that Christians derive from the operation of the Holy Spirit working through their inner consciousness and their experiences. The difference was that the Spirit reveals the truth of the very nature of things to Christians. Knowledge of God, thus, is essentially an assent to the truth that can be made only with the aid of the Spirit. Hodge calls that assent the "spiritual apprehension of the truth" or, again, the "spiritual discernment of divine things." He states, "Without knowledge there can be no religion; for religion consists in knowledge and in the effects which knowledge, through the influences of the Holy Spirit, produces upon the heart and life." Archibald Alexander concurred, emphasizing more strongly perhaps than Hodge did the fundamental difference between "spiritual knowledge" and "speculative knowledge." Spiritual knowledge, Alexander believed, touches the heart and emotions and enlightens the whole person so that one has holy feelings and a heart-felt inclination to worship God. To experience spiritual knowledge is to be converted into a new person. Ultimately, Alexander argued, this knowledge and the evidence on which it is founded is not rational or based on reasoned thinking, although it satisfies reason. It arises, rather, "from the supreme excellence of divine truth revealed to the soul, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit." The person who has received such spiritual knowledge knows without doubt that "the doctrine of the gospel is of God." The Spirit, in short, inspires those

See, for example, J. A. Alexander, "New Dispensation," 637; Green, "Christology," 441; and Hodge, "Sabbath Sanctified," 1.

Alexander T. McGill, "Tenure of the Elder's Office," PQPR New Series 1, 3 (July 1872): 580-81.

Hodge, Way of Life, 153-56, 203; and Hodge, "Sabbath Sanctified," 6.

Alexander, Practical Sermons, 9-11, 17.

who have experienced spiritual conversion so that they, and they alone, discern the deeper truths contained in human knowledge.

It should not be thought, however, that the "spiritual apprehension of the truth" involves mystical spiritualism. The Princetonians firmly believed that the Holy Spirit works through more conventional and far more effective means to bring the believer to knowledge of spiritual things. As Hodge writes,

He believed, that is, that the Holy Spirit worked through all of the professors, teachers, pastors, elders, Sunday school teachers, and others who preached and taught the orthodox evangelical system of meanings and doctrines, as well as all of their books, articles, pamphlets, sermons, and lectures. The Holy Spirit used all of these means to educate the faithful rather than mystify them, to the end that the studious, faithful student would acquire a certain knowledge of Christian truth. Archibald Alexander claims thus that the "sincere and diligent inquirer" after the truth "will be in no danger of fatal mistake" because God will attest to the veracity of divine revelations to such inquirers. Or, as Hodge puts it, God shines into the hearts of Christians and gives them "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ." John Eckard, one of Princeton's faithful outriders, went so f